Provably insecure group authentication: Not all security proofs are what they claim to be by Mitchell, Chris J
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
05
37
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
20
Provably insecure group authentication: Not all
security proofs are what they claim to be
Chris J. Mitchell
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
www.chrismitchell.net
11th May 2020
Abstract
A paper presented at the ICICS 2019 conference describes what
is claimed to be a ‘provably secure group authentication [protocol] in
the asynchronous communication model’. We show here that this is
far from being the case, as the protocol is subject to attacks breaking
the security model. To try to explain this troubling case, an earlier
(2013) scheme on which the ICICS 2019 protocol is based was also
examined and found to possess even more severe flaws — this latter
scheme was previously known to be subject to attack, but not in quite
as fundamental a way as is shown here. Examination of the ‘proofs’
of the security ‘theorems’ provided in both the 2013 and 2019 papers
reveals that in neither case are the proofs rigorous; the issues raised
by this are also briefly discussed.
1 Introduction
A paper presented at ICICS 2019 [5] describes a protocol designed to enable
members of a group to authenticate one another in a group-wise fashion. The
paper also presents a formal security model for such ‘group authentication’
schemes, and provides proofs of security for the protocol. Unfortunately, as
we describe in this paper, the protocol is completely insecure, allowing an
outsider to masquerade as any group member and set up contradictory views
of group authentication membership within a set of participating entities.
The fact that a fundamental flaw exists in a provably secure scheme is per-
haps surprising. However, as we discuss in greater detail below, examination
of the ‘proofs’ of some of the main theorems make it clear that they are
nothing of the sort. It is unfortunate that this was not noticed during the
reviewing process, a point we consider further at the end of the paper.
1
It turns out that the ICICS 2019 scheme is related to a scheme presented in
2013 [3] by one of the authors of the 2019 paper. As we discuss below, this
earlier scheme is also completely insecure. Since the 2013 scheme is slightly
simpler than the 2019 scheme, we present it and its flaws first, before doing
the same for the 2019 scheme. We observe that the 2013 scheme has been
cryptanalysed previously by Ahmadian and Jamshidpur [1], although the
attack we describe here is very much simpler than the previously published
attack.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In §2 the 2013 pro-
tocol is described, and the goals of, and security claims for, the protocol
are summarised. This leads naturally to §3 in which it is shown that the
claimed security properties do not hold by describing a very simple attack;
the ‘proofs’ of the failed theorems are also examined to see why an ap-
parently provably secure scheme is fundamentally flawed. §4 presents the
ICICS 2019 protocol, together with a summary of its design goals and se-
curity claims. This is followed by §5, where we show why it also possesses
fundamental flaws; again the ‘proofs’ of the failed theorems are examined.
Conclusions are drawn in §6.
2 The 2013 Harn scheme
2.1 Goals of the scheme
In the context of the schemes considered in this paper, a group authentication
protocol is one in which ‘each user acts both roles of the prover and the
verifier, and all users in a group are authenticated at once’ [5]. The primary
goal of such protocols is speed and efficiency, and not privacy (since all users
in such a protocol are identified to each other). As discussed, for example,
by Yang et al. [6], this contrasts with the use of the same or similar terms
elsewhere in the literature, where protocols are considered which allow an
entity to authenticate to another party as a member of a group, without
revealing his or her identity.
The main goal for a group authentication protocol as considered here is to
enable all members of a defined group to be given assurance, through exe-
cuting the protocol, that the specified members are all present and actively
involved in the protocol, and that no other parties are involved. A review
of recent work on the design of such protocols can be found in §1.1 of Xia
et al. [5].
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2.2 Operation
Harn [3] actually presents three distinct protocols. The first, the ‘basic
scheme’ is intended to demonstrate the main ideas; however, it requires
information to be divulged simultaneously by all parties and hence would
not be secure in practice. The second and third schemes are elaborations of
the basic idea designed to allow for asynchronous information release. In the
second scheme participant credentials can only be used once, whereas the
third scheme allows multiple uses of credentials. However, since the second
and third schemes are very similar in operation, for simplicity we focus here
on the second scheme.
2.2.1 Initialisation
This scheme, like all the schemes in both papers, involves a Group Manager
(GM) trusted by all participants, which pre-equips all participants with
credentials used to perform the group authentication process. We suppose
that there are n participants U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}.
To initialise the protocol, the GM performs the following steps.
• The GM chooses parameters t and k, where t determines the resistance
of the scheme to insider adversaries — that is, the scheme is designed
to be secure so long as at most t− 1 insiders collaborate. No explicit
guidance on the choice of k is given except that it must satisfy kt >
n− 1, and hence here we assume k = ⌈n/t⌉.
• The GM chooses a large prime p. All calculations are performed in
GF(p) = Zp.
• The GM chooses a cryptographic hash function H with domain Zp.
• The GM chooses a secret s ∈ Zp, and computes H(s).
• The GM selects a set of k polynomials {f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fk(x)} over Zp
of degree t− 1, where the coefficients are chosen uniformly at random
from Zp.
• The GM selects two sets of k integers {w1, w2, . . . , wk} and {d1, d2, . . . , dk}
with the property that
s =
k∑
j=1
djfj(wj),
where the values {w1, w2, . . . , wk} are all distinct.
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• The GM computes a set of k tokens {f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , fk(xi)} for each
participant Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n), where xi ∈ Zp is a unique identifier for Ui.
• Using an out-of-band secure channel, the GM equips participant Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) with t, k, p, H, the identifiers {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, the integers
{w1, w2, . . . , wk} and {d1, d2, . . . , dk}, H(s), and the participant’s own
secret tokens {f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , fk(xi)}.
2.2.2 Group authentication
We now suppose that some subset U ′ ⊆ U of the participants (where |U ′| =
m ≤ n) wish to authenticate each other in a group-wise fashion. Suppose
U ′ = {Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uzm}. We suppose every participant in U
′ is aware of
the membership of U ′. Each participant uzi ∈ U
′ now proceeds as follows.
• Compute
czi =
k∑
j=1
djfj(xzi)
m∏
r=1
r 6=i
(wj − xzr)
(xzi − xzr)
• Broadcast czi to all members of U
′.
• Once all the values {cz1 , cz2 , . . . , czm} have been received, compute
s′ =
m∑
r=1
cr.
• If H(s′) = H(s) then the protocol succeeds, i.e. all users have been
successfully authenticated.
Note that the protocol can only be executed once per initialisation, as the
secret s is revealed to anyone receiving the messages sent on the broadcast
channel. The third scheme removes this limitation.
2.3 Security claims
A number of claims are made with respect to the security properties of the
protocol. In particular the security property is claimed, namely that any
outside adversary cannot impersonate . . . a member . . . after knowing at
most n − 1 values from other members’. The meaning of impersonation in
this context is not clear, but we assume that this means that, following com-
pletion of the protocol, legitimate participants cannot end up with differing
beliefs about who are the participants in a group authentication. Sadly, as
we show below, this property does not hold.
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3 Analysis of the 2013 scheme
3.1 Previous results
As noted in §1, this scheme has previously been cryptanalysed by Ahmadian
and Jamshidpour [1]. Their approach involves performing computations
using broadcast values intercepted during protocol execution, and requires
certain conditions to be satisfied to succeed. The attack we describe below
is almost trivially simple, and works regardless of group size.
3.2 Preliminary observation
The attack we propose below relies on a very simple fact. From the de-
scription in §2.2.2 it should be clear that participant Uzi will accept that
the group authentication has succeeded if and only if the sum of the m− 1
received values czj (j 6= i) and the value czi it computed is equal to s. That
is, the correctness of individual czj values is not checked.
3.3 An outsider impersonation attack
Suppose an (insider) adversary controls the broadcast channel with respect
to ‘victim’ participant Uzi , i.e. the adversary can (a) prevent messages sent
by other legitimate participants from reaching Uzi , and (b) send messages to
Uzi on this channel that appear to have come from other legitimate partici-
pants. Since the protocol makes no assumptions about the trustworthiness of
the communications channels, this assumption is legitimate (indeed, if the
broadcast channel was completely trustworthy, then the security protocol
would not be needed).
The adversary does two things. Firstly it legitimately engages in the protocol
with an arbitrary subset U ′′ of the legitimate participants, where Uzi 6∈ U
′′.
As a result of completing this protocol, the adversary now knows s. Dur-
ing execution of the protocol, the adversary prevents any of the broadcast
messages reaching Uzi . The adversary now engages with the ‘victim’ par-
ticipant Uzi , suggesting that a group authentication is to be performed by
the members of an arbitrary set of participants U ′ ⊆ U , where Uzi ∈ U
′
and |U ′| = m, say. This may involve sending ‘fake’ messages to Uzi that
apparently originate from the other members of U ′.
The adversary now chooses values czj (j 6= i) for Uzj ∈ U
′, and starts sending
them to Uzi as if they come from the members of U
′. The only condition the
values must satisfy is that they sum to s−czi . Of course, this means that the
adversary cannot send all m−1 values to Uzi until czi is sent by Uzi , but the
protocol is meant to be used ‘asynchronously’, i.e. where not all participants
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send their messages at the same time. It should be immediately obvious
that Uzi will accept the success of the protocol, although clearly the group
authentication that Uzi believes has occurred has not actually occurred.
Note that the third scheme in the 2013 paper [3] suffers from a precisely
analogous attack.
3.4 What about the security theorems?
The fact that the protocol is so fundamentally flawed is perhaps surprising
given Theorem 2, [3], which asserts that the scheme ‘has the properties of
the t-secure m-user n-group authentication scheme . . . if kt > n− 1’. This
appears to contradict the simple attack we have just described. The answer
is simple — the ‘proof’ of Theorem 2 only attempts to show that an adver-
sary cannot forge legitimate values czj , but the attack does not require this.
Thus it is clear that the ‘proof’ is making unwarranted assumptions about
how an attack might be launched, and as such Theorem 2 is demonstrably
not a theorem at all.
To be fair, this shortcoming was already noted by Xia et al. [5], who observe
that the security properties of the 2013 scheme ‘are only justified by heuristic
arguments rather than formal security proofs’. Unfortunately, despite a
much more formal approach, we show below that the Xia et al. scheme is
also completely insecure, and that the proofs in that paper are not rigorous.
4 The Xia-Harn-Yang-Zhang-Mu-Susilo-Meng scheme
4.1 Goals of scheme
The second protocol we consider here, [5], is also an example of a group
authentication protocol in the sense given in §2.1. Xia et al. [5] go much
further than much of the prior art in attempting to formalise the goals and
security model for a group authentication scheme. However, even here the
specific objectives of such a protocol are left a little vague. The following
statement is the closest to a formal definition.
In general, a group authentication scheme works as follows. The
group manager (GM) generates a number of credentials, and
sends each of these credentials to a user in the group. In the
authentication stage, every participating user uses her credential
to compute a token and broadcasts it. Subsequently, every user
can use the revealed information to verify whether all users are
belonging to the same group.
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4.2 Operation
As in the 2013 protocol, the scheme can be divided into two phases: initiali-
sation, when the GM equips each participant with the credentials needed to
perform group authentication, and the group authentication phase where a
subset of the participants simultaneously authenticate each other as a group.
4.2.1 Initialisation
Again as before we suppose that there are n participants U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un}.
To initialise the protocol, the GM performs the following steps.
• The GM chooses parameters t and ℓ, where the scheme is designed to
be secure as long as at most t−1 insiders collaborate, and ℓ determines
the number of group authentication sessions that can be performed
before new credentials need to be issued.
• The GM chooses a cyclic group G (expressed multiplicatively) with
order a large prime q, and randomly selects g1, g2, . . . , gℓ to be ℓ inde-
pendent generators of G.
• The GM chooses a cryptographic hash function H with domain G.
• The GM chooses a secret s ∈ Zq, and computes the ℓ values H((gi)
s),
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
• The GM randomly selects a polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i over Zq of
degree t− 1, where a0 = s.
• The GM computes a credential si = f(xi) for each participant Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), where xi ∈ Zp is a unique identifier for Ui.
• Using an out-of-band secure channel, the GM equips participant Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) with t, G, q, H, the identifiers {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, the genera-
tors {g1, g2, . . . , gℓ}, the hash codes {H((g1)
s),H((g2)
s), . . . ,H((gℓ)
s)},
and the participant’s own secret credential si(= f(xi)).
4.2.2 Group authentication
Just as in the 2013 scheme, we now suppose that some subset U ′ ⊆ U of
the participants (where |U ′| = m ≤ n) wish to authenticate each other in
a group-wise fashion. Suppose U ′ = {Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uzm}. We suppose every
participant in U ′ is aware of the membership of U ′. We further suppose that
the set of participants has reached session number σ in the period of use of
a particular credential set, where 1 ≤ σ ≤ ℓ. Note that each session must
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be conducted using a new value of σ, and σ determines which generator gσ
from the set of generators will be used in this particular protocol instance.
Each participant uzi ∈ U
′ proceeds as follows.
• Choose uzi ∈ Zq uniformly at random, and broadcast it to all other
participants.
• Once the set of values {uz1 , uz2 , . . . , uzm} has been received, compute:
γi =
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj<zi
(gσ)
uzj
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj>zi
(gσ)
−uzj ,
Li =
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj 6=zi
xzj
xzj − xzi
,
and
czi = (gσ)
sziLi(γi)
uzi .
• Broadcast czi to all members of U
′.
• Once all the values {cz1 , cz2 , . . . , czm} have been received, compute
m∏
r=1
czr .
• If H(
∏m
r=1 czr) = H((gσ)
s) then the protocol succeeds, i.e. all users
have been successfully authenticated.
4.3 Security claims
We first observe that Xia et al. [5] make the following statement about the
assumed properties of the broadcast channel.
Note that the broadcast channel is only assumed to be asyn-
chronous, such that messages sent from the uncorrupted users
to the corrupted ones can be delivered relatively fast, in which
case, the adversary can wait for the messages of the uncorrupted
users to arrive, then decide on her computation and communi-
cation, and still get her messages delivered to the honest users
on time.
The security model of Xia et al. [5] gives the No impersonation property as
follows.
The outside adversary AO cannot impersonate a group member
without being detected, even if AO computes her token after
seeing all other users’ tokens in the asynchronous networks.
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5 Analysis of the ICICS 2019 scheme
5.1 Preliminary observation
We consider what can be learnt by observing a single value czi in a single
instance of the protocol, together with the initial broadcasts of the values
{uz1 , uz2 , . . . , uzm}. We suppose that the (outside) observer has access to
the system parameters, i.e. the values provided by the GM to all partic-
ipants, namely t, G, q, H, the identifiers {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, the generators
{g1, g2, . . . , gℓ}, and the hash codes {H((g1)
s),H((g2)
s), . . . ,H((gℓ)
s)}.
As defined in §4.2.2:
czi = (gσ)
sziLi(γi)
uzi .
Now, again as defined above
γi =
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj<zi
(gσ)
uzj
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj>zi
(gσ)
−uzj ,
i.e. computing γi does not involve any secret credential values and hence is
simple to derive for anyone with access to the system credentials. Since we
also supposed that uzi has been intercepted, the observer can thus compute
czi .(γi)
−uzi = (gσ)
sziLi .
Next observe that, yet again as defined above
Li =
∏
j∈{1,2,...,m}
zj 6=zi
xzj
xzj − xzi
,
and hence Li is also available to anyone with access to the system credentials.
Having derived Li, the observer now computes a valueM such thatMLi ≡ 1
(mod q), a calculation which is simple to perform given that q is known
(see, for example, Algorithm 2.142 of Menezes et al. [4]). Note that M is
guaranteed to exist since q is prime (see, for example, Fact 2.119, [4]).
It then follows immediately that
[czi .(γi)
−uzi ]M = (gσ)
sziLiM = (gσ)
szi .
That is, an observer of czi and the values {uz1 , uz2 , . . . , uzm} can compute
(gσ)
szi .
5.2 An outsider impersonation attack
The above observation leads to a very simple and powerful attack, enabling
impersonation of a participant in any group. The attack scenario is very
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similar to that described in §3.3. We suppose an (outsider) adversary con-
trols the broadcast channel with respect to ‘victim’ participant Uzi , i.e. the
adversary can (a) prevent messages sent by other legitimate participants
from reaching Uzi , and (b) send messages to Uzi on this channel that appear
to have come from other legitimate participants. Finally we assume that it
is ‘time’ for a session using the group generator gσ.
We first suppose the adversary observes a group of participants U ′′ ⊆ U
(where Uzi 6∈ U
′′) engaging in the protocol. The adversary:
• intercepts all the uzj and czj values sent by each Uzj ∈ U
′′;
• uses these intercepted values, together with the system parameters, to
compute (gσ)
szj for each Uzj ∈ U
′′;
• prevents any of the messages reaching Uzi .
We now suppose that the adversary persuades the victim participant Uzi
that it is being invited to join a group of participants U ′ ⊆ U ′′ ∪ {Uzi},
where Uzi ∈ U
′, e.g. by sending ‘fake’ messages from members of U ′ to
Uzi . The adversary chooses arbitrary values uzj for every Uzj ∈ U
′ − {Uzi},
and sends these values to Uzi as if they come from Uzj . Once Uzi sends
its value uzi , the adversary can use the complete set of values {uzj} and
the computed values (gσ)
szj (which it has for every Uzj ∈ U
′ − {Uzi}) to
compute the ‘correct’ values czj for every Uzj ∈ U
′ − {Uzi}, which it sends
to the victim participant Uzi . Since all the received values are ‘correct’, the
victim will falsely believe that it is part of a group authentication with a set
of participants, of whom none believe they are being authenticated to the
victim.
5.3 Other possible attack scenarios
There are many other scenarios in which the observation in §5.1 could be
used to launch an attack on the protocol. For example, if an attacker could
control the broadcast network with respect to two victims, a range of con-
flicting beliefs about who has been authenticated to whom could be estab-
lished. That is, once an attacker has observed a participant Uzj output a
value czj , this can be used to impersonate Uzj in any group the attacker
chooses (assuming control over the broadcast channel).
5.4 What about the proof of security?
The attack described above clearly breaks the ‘no impersonation’ property
given in §4.3. However Theorem 4 [5] states that ‘The proposed group
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authentication scheme satisfies the no impersonation property, assuming
that H is a preimage resistant hash function and the DDH assumption holds
in G’. The attack does not invalidate the assumptions of the theorem, and
hence the theorem must be false.
How can this be true? Well, examination of the ‘proof’ of Theorem 4 sug-
gests why. The proof apparently only deals with the ‘honest but curious’
case, where all participants are assumed to follow the protocol correctly.
The sort of manipulation of messages and beliefs involved in the attack do
not appear to be covered by the proof.
Indeed, this is partly admitted by Xia et al. [5]. In the concluding section of
their paper, it is stated that ‘There are two distinct approaches to defining
security for cryptographic protocols: simulation proof and reduction proof.
The former is more intuitive because it models security of the targeted prob-
lem via an ideally trusted third party. However, the definitions will become
complicated once all details are filled in. In contrast, the reduction proof
yields definitions that are simpler to describe and easier to work with. How-
ever, the adequacy for modelling the problem is less clear. In this paper,
we followed the latter approach, and it is still open how to provide formal
security treatment for group authentication using the simulation proof.’
6 Conclusions
We have examined two different group authentication protocols, and found
that both possess fundamental flaws. Clearly this means that neither of them
should be used in practice. Fortunately there are many well-established and
relatively efficient means of performing authentication — see, for example,
Boyd et al. [2].
The fundamental flaws in the protocols exist despite the fact that in both
cases ‘theorems’ are provided asserting their security. Indeed, in the more
recent case, the theorems are given within the context of a formal security
model. This is clearly worrying — modern cryptography takes as a funda-
mental tenet that ‘proofs of security’ are necessary, but clearly they are not
of much value if the proofs are false.
Of course, mistakes in proofs are commonplace, but in these cases the lack of
rigour is clearly not just a mistake. In the earlier paper there is no formal se-
curity model, and the theorems are simply heuristic arguments. Even in the
more recent paper, the authors themselves admit that the proof techniques
used are not sufficient to establish the claimed results. This clearly suggests
that reviewers need the time to carefully review proofs for adequacy. This
flies in the face of the modern obsession with speedy publication, both for
conferences and many journals (e.g. IEEE Access which allows referees only
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a week to complete a review). Perhaps we, as the research community, need
to think more carefully about finding ways to allow reviewers the time and
space to write carefully considered and detailed reviews.
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